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1
Police Interrogation
and the Supreme Courtthe Latest Round
by Prof. Jerold H. Israel*
My first task is to explain to some degree the nature of the
problem embodied in our title. This book has been designated as "Escobedo-The Second Round." What we will be discussing is a series of cases, decided in June, 1966, the most
noteworthy of which is Miranda v. Arizona [384 U.S. 436 (1966)].
In these cases, the United States Supreme Court prescribed a
new set of standards governing the introduction in evidence of
statements obtained from the defendant through police interrogation. Actually, to a degree these standards were not entirely
new. They had been suggested, at least in part, in the Escobedo
decision in June, 1964 [Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 ( 1964 )].
In that respect the Miranda standards can properly be described as "Escobedo-The Second Round." Really, however,
the standards laid down go so far beyond those prescribed in
Escobedo itself, that it is more accurate to describe this series
of cases as "Miranda-The First Round" or, to be more accurate, "Police Interrogation and the Supreme Court-The
Latest Round."
*Associate Professor, The University of Michigan Law School.
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16 I SCOPE AND SIGNIFICANCE
The various chapters will deal with several aspects of the
second-round cases and the problems that they present. My
responsibility basically is to provide a general background for
the chapters that follow. It is to provide an over-view, a basic
context for appreciating the points to be raised in subsequent
presentations. Thus, I will attempt first to describe the background of the Miranda decision, second, to describe the decision itself, and third, to raise in a general way some basic
problems and ambiguities that are presented as a result of the
decision. In this regard, I must say I am most fortunate because I have the opportunity simply to pose questions, but not
the responsibility of answering them. I leave that for those who
follow.

Miranda's Holding
In describing the general background of the "second round"
cases, it perhaps is best to begin not at the beginning but at the
end. It may be helpful in understanding how we came to Miranda to know first something about what that decision itself
holds. Actually, the Miranda decision deals with a series of
four cases decided on June 13, 1966, in a single opinion: Miranda v. Arizona, Vignera v. New York, Westover v. United
States, and California v. Stewart. Since the Court issued only
a single opinion covering the four cases, and the Miranda
case was first mentioned in the masthead, the case is generally
referred to as the Miranda decision.
All four cases involved in the Miranda decision concerned
violent crimes-rape, robbery, etc. In each case the defendant
was arrested and taken to the police station where he was interrogated. The interrogation lasted for various periods. In
Miranda's own case, it lasted only two hours before the defendant confessed. In another, Westover, the defendant was interrogated by Kansas City police officers before being turned
over to the F.B.I.; the state interrogation continued intermittently over a fourteen-hour period. In each case a conf~ession
was obtained and used in evidence to obtain a conviction. A di-
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vided Supreme Court found in each case that the admission of
the confession was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantee of due process. The Miranda, Westover, and Vignera
cases were decided on a 5-4 basis with the Chief Justice writing
the opinion and Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan and Fortas
concurring. Justices Harlan, White and Stewart dissented in
all cases, and Justice Clark dissented in all except the Stewart
case, which was decided by a 6-3 vote.
The reasoning of the majority is summarized in the opinion
itself:
. . . [T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from ~custodial inter-·
rogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we
mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As
for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other
fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons
of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required.
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that
he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he
has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained
or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of
these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any
manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to
consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no
questioni~. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact
that he may have answered some questions or volunteered
some statements on his own does not deprive him of the
right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until
he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents
to be questioned. [384 U.S. at 444-45]
The Court thus sets up certain standards to be followed in obtaining statements through custodial interrogation by police
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officers. Custodial interrogation specifically is defined as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way." [384 U.S. at 444] There
was no question in each of these cases that there had been custodial interrogation, since the defendants clearly had been
taken into custody prior to questioning. In such a situation, the
Court held, :police officers must give the defendant four warnings: First, the defendant must be told of his right to remain
silent. Second, he must be told that anything that he says can
be and will be used against him in court. Third, he must be
told that he has a right to consult with an attorney prior to the
interrogation and to have the attorney present during the interrogation. Fourth, in this connection, he must be informed
that if he cannot afford an attorney, an attorney will be appointed for him. Since these four warnings were not given prior
to interrogation in the Miranda, Westover, Vignera and Stewart cases, the confessions obtained as result of that interrogation were excluded from evidence as obtained in violation of the
due process clause of the Constitution. It should be emphasized
that I am, of course, referring here only to the majority opinion.

Development of the Doctrine
Having described the holding of the Miranda case, perhaps
we may now return to the beginning of our story, and consider
how the Court came to this result. For, at first glance, what we
see here appears to be rather strange indeed: a federal court,
by a margin of one vote, sets up a detailed code of police inte:r:rogation practices, "enforced" by the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of those practices.
One may ask, first, how a federal court could rea~h this position with respect to the operation of state and local police
officers. The starting point in answering this question necessarily is the Fourteenth Amendment. That amendment provides that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or
property without due process of law. It seems clear that this
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language gives the Supreme Court, as the ultimate interpreter
of the Constitution, the authority to determine what constitutes
due process insofar as the states' operations in the criminal
procedure arena are concerned.
Actually, although the Fourteenth Amendment was passed
shortly after the Civil War, it was not until many years later
that the Court began to examine the basic operation of state
criminal procedure. In fact, the first case involving police interrogation on a constitutional level, so far as the states were
concerned, was decided only in 1936. That case, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), was an ideal beginning because
its facts were as barbarous as could be imagined.
In Brown it was alleged that the defendant's confession to
murder had been obtained by what amounted to physical torture. While the nature of the physical abuse made it obvious,
especially during the trying times of the late 1930's, that the
Court would reverse the conviction obtained through use of
the confession, it was not entirely clear exactly what basis
would be found for the reversal.
At first glance, it might appear that the Fifth Amendment
would furnish the most appropriate ground, since it provides
that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal trial. But the Fifth Amendment presented
two problems. First, the concept of compulsion as used in the
Fifth Amendment was not considered to be applicable to the
police because they had no legal authority to compel an answer, although it was quite clear that the torture in effect constituted a very strong form of compulsion. Second, and probably of more pressing significance, only the Fourteenth
Amendment applied to the states and not the Fifth, and the
concept of due process in the Fourteenth Amendment had been
restricted only to those rights deemed fundamental in a civilized
society. Twenty years earlier, in Twining v. New Jersey
[211 U.S. 78 ( 1908)], the Court had indicated that the privilege was not itself a fundamental right that was absorbed by
the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause and so made
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applicable to the states. Therefore, the Brown decision had to
be based on some ground other than the strict privilege against
self-incrimination.
The Court did in fact reverse Brown's conviction, but on the
ground that the confession, because it had been obtained by
torture, was not necessarily trustworthy, so that Brown had
been deprived of a fair trial when his conviction was based on
untrustworthy evidence. This ground clearly fitted within the
"fundamental rights" interpretation of the due process clause,
since it recognized that basic trial fairness was an essential
attribute of due process.
Between the decision in Brown in 1936 and the decision in
Miranda in 1966, there was a steady stream of confessions
cases that manifested a process of gradual development of doctrine. While the Court at first concerned itself with confessions that were "coerced" through physical brutality, it soon
began to reverse convictions based upon confessions obtained
as a result of "psychological" coercion. Confessions obtained
as result of threats and lengthy questioning, and in one case
even through the use of a psychiatrist [Leyra v. Denno, 347
U.S. 556 ( 1954 )], were found to be invalid. It was thus clear
even ten years before Miranda that the key to the exclusion of
confessions was no longer the issue of the trustworthiness of
the confession.
The Court clearly stated this in the Spano case in 1959 [Spano
v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 ( 1959)]. There, a close friend played
upon the sympathy of the defendant and in this manner caused
him to confess. In reversing the conviction based on the confession, the Court stressed that its opinion was based not on lack
of trustworthiness of the confession, but was instead tied to the
impropriety of the police action in putting pressure upon an
individual to make him testify against his will. With this point
well established, the Supreme Court in a series of cases over
the succeeding five years, in one instance after another, held
the use of various techniques to constitute undue pressure resulting in "involuntary" confessions.
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Then, in 1964, the Court decided the Escobedo case. Escobedo had been arrested on suspicion of homicide. His request
to see his lawyer was denied. When his lawyer actually came
to the stationhouse to see Escobedo, the lawyer's request to
see his client was also denied. After four hours of interrogation, Escobedo confessed. The Court in Escobedo did not rely
on the "undue pressure" rationale of coerced confessions to reverse Escobedo's conviction. Instead, it approached the area
of police interrogation along a new path-the right to counsel.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the assistance of counsel in
all criminal cases. Prior to 1963 that amendment had not been
held to be incorporated bodily into the Fourteenth Amendment.
But in the now famous Gideon case [Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963)], the Court specifically held that the principles encompassed in the Sixth Amendment were all fundamental without exception and therefore completely applicable
to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment due process
clause. Escobedo had not had the opportunity to consult with
his lawyer and his lawyer with him. This in itself, the Court
ruled, could require the exclusion of Escobedo's statement as
obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
The holding, however, was limited to the specific facts
of the Escobedo case. The Court specifically noted that this
was a case where: ( 1 ) the investigation was no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but had begun to focus
on a particular suspect, (2) the suspect had been taken into custody, (3) the police had carried out a process of interrogation
that lent itself to eliciting incriminating statements, ( 4) the
suspect had requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and (5) the police had not specifically
warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent. All this, the Court noted, added up to a denial of the assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment "as
made obligatory upon the states by the Fourteenth Amendment," which in turn required the exclusion of any statements
elicited during the interrogation.
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During the two years following Escobedo the state and lower
federal courts placed varying interpretations on its holding.
Some narrowly restricted the case to its facts, while others
read it as broadly applicable even if the specific circumstances
mentioned in Escobedo itself were not present.

Departures from Escobedo
The Miranda case was viewed before it was decided as the
vehicle by which the Court would clarify the Escobedo decision. In fact, Miranda turned out to be not a mere clarification or even a modification. It cut a new path with new signposts,
although it seems to go in the same general direction as the
Escobedo case. There are various differences between the
Escobedo and Miranda decisions that should be noted.
First, the Miranda case rests on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as applied to the states under
the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than upon the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. However, the Escobedo case, it should be
noted, did mention the Fifth Amendment even though it was
not based on that amendment.
Second, the Miranda case speaks in terms of the presence of
counsel during interrogation in order to protect the selfincrimination privilege, whereas Escobedo is couched basically in terms of the right to consult with counsel prior to interrogation. Also, while Escobedo was in terms of consultation
with one's own lawyer, Miranda is in terms of the right of the
person interrogated to the presence of his own counsel or, if
he cannot afford counsel, of counsel appointed by the state.
Third, Escobedo turned on the focus of the inquiry upon the
accused as well as on the fact that the accused in that case had
been in custody. The Miranda case rests strictly on the fact of
custodial interrogation. The Court does define custodial interrogation [384 U.S. at 444] as encompassing any situation in
which an individual is taken in custody or "otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way." In offering
this definition, the Court appends a footnote that this is what it
had referred to when in Escobedo it spoke of an investigation
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which had focused on an accused. While this may very well be
what the Court did in fact refer to, it seems quite clear that the
concept of a custodial interrogation might encompass far fewer
situations than those within the concept of "focus on the accused."
Fourth, it should be noted that Miranda purports to recognize some legislative power to provide other devices to protect the privilege against self-incrimination. While it denominates the standards it imposes as constitutionally required, it
notes that these are required in order to protect the basic privilege against self-incrimination; the states may well find
other means to further that protection [384 U.S. at 467]. The
Escobedo case, in contrast, made no suggestion that there was
any leeway in the specific requirements on interrogation that
it imposed.

The Opinion Dissected
Having described the background of Miranda, and the points
at which Miranda departs from the prior cases, it may be worthwhile to examine the opinion in greater detail. It is divided into
five parts. The first two lay out the basic themes of the opinion. The third sets up the rules that the Court will impose to
govern police interrogation. The fourth justifies these rules,
and the fifth applies them to the facts of the four cases before
the Court.
In Part One, the Court deals with the nature of the interrogation process. It notes that all persons questioned by police are
generally questioned in a room cut off from the outside world.
It is quite clear throughout this section that the Court speaks
in terms of police station, in-custody interrogation, although its
eventual definition of "custodial interrogation" comprehends
any restriction that might deprive a person of his freedom of
action in any significant way, and thus appears to be much
broader than stationhouse interrogation. The Court concludes
that interrogation of this kind is inherently compulsive. It relies on several police manuals describing police interrogation
to emphasize the following factors: The interrogation is secret
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and private. The police tend to display a persistence which
wears the individual down. Frequently it is accompanied by
deception; excuses are offered to encourage the man to testify. Sometimes the interrogators presume to offer legal advice and the individual is persuaded not to call upon an attorney. The Court therefore concludes that these techniques inevitably lead to intimidation that in many cases trades on the
weakness of the individual.
This conclusion that police interrogation is inherently compulsive is sharply attacked by the dissenters. The dissenters
first question the Court's ability to obtain an accurate description of total police practice throughout the country on the basis
of a few police manuals. They also question the accuracy of the
Court's description of the impact of these techniques on criminal defendants.
Having established that police interrogation is inherently
compulsive, the Court next considers whether this compulsion
violates the privilege against self-incrimination. The primary
issue here is whether the privilege applies to police interrogation. The argument was made that it did not because there was
no legal compulsion to testify. It also had been argued, as I
mentioned previously, that the Fifth Amendment privilege was
not fundamental, and therefore did not apply to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court was able to reject both contentions on the basis of various precedents. It cited
in particular an early federal case, the Bram case [Bram v.
United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897)], which applied the privilege
to a confessions case. It noted further that in recent years, most
notably in Escobedo and the Malloy case [Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 ( 1964)], the Fifth Amendment had been held to be
fundamental in all respects and thus applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. It concluded that the
logic behind the Fifth Amendment privilege of self-incrimination
was meant to apply to informal compulsion like that imposed
through police interrogation. This conclusion was also a point
of major contention by the dissents, which questioned the his-
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torical accuracy of the majority's conclusion that police interrogation was within the purpose and function of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Having established that the privilege did apply to police interrogation, and that such interrogation had an inherent tendency to violate that privilege, the Court then set forth various
rules and regulations necessary to protect the privilege. In doing so, however, the Court noted that the rules announced were
not absolutes, but that in the absence of legislation they were
to be applied. The Court stated in particular:
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives
for protecting the privilege which might be devised by
Congress or the States in the exercise of their creative rulemaking capacities. Therefore we cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular
solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation
process as it is presently conducted. Our decision in no
way creates a constitutional straitjacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this
effect. We encourage Congress and the States to continue
their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual while promoting efficient
enforcement of our criminal laws. However, unless we are
shown other procedures which are at least as effective in
apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in
assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following safeguards must be observed. [384 U.S. at 467]
The Court then proceeds to lay down the safeguards. The first
is the warning of the fact that the individual has a privilege
against self-incrimination. The Court emphasizes that this
warning must be given in "clear and unequivocal terms."
The reasons for requiring the warning are: ( 1 ) Some defendants
may be unaware of the privilege. ( 2) Even if they are aware,
it may be too difficult to determine on a case-by-case basis who
was and who was not aware of his privilege. ( 3) Even though
the person clearly was aware of his privilege the mere fact that
the warning is given indicates an absence of pressure. This in
turn tends to overcome the inherent pressure in the police interrogation process by showing that the police recognize the
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existence of the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination,
and indicate their willingness to abide by his exercise of privilege.
The Court then turns to its second required warning, that anything the individual says can and will be used against him. This
is obviously necessary in order to reinforce the warning that
the individual has a privilege against self-incrimination. The
Court is not entirely clear in its statement, however, as to exactly in what form this warning should be given. At one point
[384 U.S. at 469] it talks in terms of a statement that the evidence "can and will" be used against the defendant. At another
point the term used is that the evidence "may" be used against
the defendant [384 U.S. at 444]. There is an obvious ambiguity here into which, I understand, we will go more thoroughly.
The Court then turns to what may be the crux of the Miranda
warnings. The individual must be told that he has the right to
have counsel present and to consult with counsel. It is important to emphasize that the Court here goes beyond Escobedo.
There is no requirement that the individual initiate the request
that he be given the opportunity to consult with counsel or to
have counsel present. The offer must first be made by the
police. The Court emphasizes that this is the only way to protect the right not to incriminate one's self.
First, the warning of privilege may not itself be sufficient
because the pressure inherent in the interrogation process may
overcome the effect of that warning. Second, even preliminary discussions with counsel prior to interrogation may not be
enough, as evidenced by the Escobedo case in which the defendant actually had talked with his counsel before he was
picked up for interrogation. Third, if the individual does decide
to make a statement, counsel according to the Court can ensure
an accurate statement. Finally, though this ground is not
stressed by the Court, it is very clear that counsel will also
serve as a witness to the making of the statement; he therefore serves as an outside third party who destroys the secrecy
of the interrogation process.
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The Court then goes on to make an obvious point. The rich
defendant can obtain his own counsel, and therefore the indigent defendant must have the same opportunity. He must be
told that he can have appointed counsel and that no questioning will be done until counsel is appointed and present. This
is based on the principle developed in a series of cases arising
in Illinois, holding that a poor defendant should not have fewer
procedural rights than the rich defendant, at least in terms of
the functional effect of those rights. The Court emphasizes,
however, that while the indigent is entitled to have a lawyer appointed if the police engage in interrogation, there is no automatic requirement that a lawyer be appointed in any event.
If the police do not engage in interrogation, the Court does not
require them at this early a stage in the proceeding to obtain
the appointment of counsel for the indigent.
The Court then proceeds to discuss what must be done after
the four warnings have been given [384 U.S. at 475-76]. It notes
at the outset that if the defendant indicates "in any manner''
that he does not want to be interrogated, no interrogation can
ensue. It further notes that even if the defendant starts to answer questions, interrogation must cease immediately, if he later
stops answering or indicates that he would like to consult
a lawyer at that point. I think, myself, that this is an additional
point that could very well be included in the original warnings.
Also, if the defendant indicates that he will answer questions,
but first desires to see a lawyer, no questioning can of course
be undertaken until the lawyer arrives and the defendant has
had full opportunity to consult with him. If a lawyer is present,
however, and the defendant asks not to make a statement, the
Court indicates that possibly some questioning may still be
done. This is a little developed aspect of the Escobedo decision
which is noted in footnote 44 [384 U.S. at 474].
The opinion then turns to the very important issue of waiver,
for of course if the defendant waives his right to consult with
counsel, and his privilege against self-incrimination, his confession may be admitted [384 U.S. at 478]. The issue there-
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fore arises as to what constitutes waiver. The Court notes at
the outset that a heavy burden rests on the prosecution to
prove waiver; the prosecution can best bear that burden
because the facts are more readily available to it than to the
defendant. It emphasizes that an express statement can constitute waiver but that waiver will not be assumed from silence.
Nor will waiver be assumed from a partial answer. The Court
indicates also what problems may be presented in the waiver
area. It suggests that if there is a lengthy interrogation or incommunicado incarceration after the person has supposedly
waived, there is a serious question about the voluntariness of
the waiver. Also, any waiver obtained by trickery, threats
or cajolery will not be viewed as voluntary. Finally, the Court
turns to the consequences of a statement obtained after an involuntary waiver, or resulting from a failure to give the warnings or to respect the defendant's request to remain silent or
have his lawyer present.
The Court stresses that any statement obtained in violation
of the defendant's rights must be excluded from evidence. This
applies to any statement, whether it be a confession or an admission, and whether inculpatory or exculpatory. In other words,
if the defendant says, "I didn't do it, X did it," or "I shot him but
he shot first," his statement is as excludable from evidence as
if he had confessed to commission of the whole crime, and to
all its elements as well.
The Court stresses, however, that there are limits to this exclusionary rule; it applies, as do all the requirements in the
opinion, only to statements obtained as a result of custodial
interrogation. The majority points out, for example, that if a
person should voluntarily enter a police station and state that
he wishes to give a confession, the confession would be admissible because voluntary. Furthermore, statements may be admissible if they were the result of a general inquiry when the
person was not under restraint. The Court emphasizes [384 U.S.
at 4 77] that general on-the-scene questioning about facts surrounding the crime is not prohibited by the Miranda holding.
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Finally, in Part Four of the opinion, the Court tries to show
that its ruling is consistent with efficient law enforcement. It
stresses the importance of protecting individual rights, questions the need for the use of confessions in many cases, and
stresses in particular that the F.B.I. has followed a practice
very similar to that which it establishes. It also notes the English and Scottish experience with similar types of rules. This
part of the majority opinion is subjected to a sharp dissent by
Justice Clark who emphasizes that the F.B.I. did not in fact follow a practice identical to Miranda; there were a number of
important differences in the F.B.I. practice. In particular, as
Justice Clark sees it, the F.B.I. traditionally informed the defendant that he had a right to have counsel appointed by the
judge, but did not state that they would not question him until
that counsel was in fact appointed. Also, according to Justice
Clark, the F.B.I. had always continued to question on matters
other than the individual's guilt even after he had insisted that
he wished to claim privilege against self-incrimination. I must
say, as a side matter, that certainly on this issue, my limited
conversations with F.B.I. officials suggest that Justice Clark
more accurately describes past Bureau practices than does
the majority opinion.
The fifth section of the opinion is somewhat anticlimactic.
Having established its rules concerning custodial interrogation and having justified those rules historically and theoreti-·
cally, the Court applies them to the facts of the cases before it.
In all four situations before it, the Miranda requirements had
of course not been complied with in their entirety, and the
confessions were therefore excludable.

Unresolved Problems
Although the Miranda opinion is quite extensive and the Court
more than once succinctly summarizes its rulings, the case is
still not clear in all respects. Ambiguities lie in several points
that the Court raises, and the Miranda rules also suggest new
possibilities which were not presented to the Court in the Miranda setting. I would like at this point to mention briefly some
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of these issues, which will be dealt with in subsequent chapters.
First, what is the nature of custodial interrogation emphasized by the Court? Although the cases before the court all involved in-custody interrogation, the Court's definition extends
much beyond that. The Court talks in terms of one who is deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Would
this apply to a person who is stopped on the street? Would it
apply to a person who is questioned at home? The Court notes
that there is a different psychological impact if a person is
questioned at home [384 U.S. at 449]. At a later point [384
U.S. 478, note 46] it quotes a Scottish court that also noted the
difference between questioning at home and in a police station.
Would the answer depend upon the presence of other persons, or
on whether there is more than one police officer involved in the
questioning, or how the questioning was phrased, or on something besides these matters? Would the Court possibly accept
the concept that there may be a continuum involved here? In
other words, in some situations far removed from custodial
interrogation no warning might be needed. In an instance of
custodial interrogation, all the warnings must be given. Perhaps, in areas that fall somewhere between, like on-the-street
interrogation or at-home questioning, it might be necessary
only to warn the individual beforehand against self-incrimination, but not necessary to warn him of his right to counsel, or
perhaps to the appointment of counsel. In this regard, one obvious factor of considerable significance will be the determination of what exactly is left of the "focus upon the individual
suspect" concept of the Escobedo case. As I mentioned earlier,
the Court indicated that its definition of custodial interrogation
encompasses this concept [384 U.S. at 444, note 4].
Second, another question of utmost importance will concern
the determination of waiver. What if a person refuses to sign a
waiver form? Are there also some persons who because of their
peculiar background or low intelligence are in such a condition
that they may not waive their rights in the absence of a lawyer?
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Still a third question will be the means by which a lawyer
will be obtained for the indigent. What of the delay involved in
getting a lawyer? Will that have a bearing on the duty of prompt
arraignment, especially in lightly-populated regions where considerable delay may be involved?
Fourth, what is the consequence of failure to give the Miranda warnings? Does it merely require the exclusion of the
confession, or does it also require the exclusion of any evidence
obtained through leads furnished by the confession? This raises
the issue as to whether the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is applicable to the ruling, a point discussed at length by
Professor George and Justice Cohen.
A fifth question concerns what remains of the right to counsel concept of Escobedo. Does Escobedo continue to have any
independent validity? For example, there are presently before
the Court two cases involving a line-up in which the defendant
insisted upon the right to consult with counsel before appearing
in the line-up. Do these cases continue to pose some sort of
Sixth Amendment problem, or could Escobedo now be looked
upon as basically a Fifth Amendment case? In this regard,
also, what if the defendant does not request to see his lawyer
and indeed indicates that he would like to continue the discussion without a lawyer, but his lawyer requests the opportunity to see his client? In this context the New York case
cited by the Court is of interest [384 U.S. at 465, footnote 35].
One other issue which may have relevance concerns the impact of the Massiah case [Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201 (1964 )], which deals with application of the right to counsel when a person is being interrogated after indictment by
a person whom he does not realize to be in the employ of the
police. Could the Massiah case now be looked upon as a Fifth
Amendment self-incrimination case, and if so, could that Fifth
Amendment concept be extended to the pre-indictment stage?
I really have serious doubts about such an extension of the
Massiah doctrine, but it should be noted that Miranda creates
this possibility, though I do not consider it much more than
that.

32 I SCOPE AND SIGNIFICANCE
It should be emphasized that one of the major issues opened
up by Miranda has already been settled. In the Johnson case,
[Johnson v. New jersey, 384 U.S. 719 ( 1966)], the Court held
that Miranda was not retroactive, but will apply only to cases
that go to trial after June 13, 1966. A similar approach was
adopted for the Escobedo case; its ruling will be applied only
to cases tried after it was decided. The purpose of the Court in
refusing to apply its decision retroactively is very clear. It is
not equally clear, however, exactly why it chose the date of
trial, rather than the date at which the confessions were obtained. Apparently, the primary concern was that the prosecutor realized before going to trial that the confessions were
not sufficient in themselves. I would think, however, an equally
important factor might have been that the police officers at the
time the confession was obtained before the Miranda ruling, could
hardly have been expected to anticipate that ruling.
Finally, the Miranda case may have some implications for
other areas of criminal procedure. For example, I think it may
reflect on the type of consent needed for a search. It may also
be relevant with respect to the possible extension of other
constitutional rights to the state defendants by virtue of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as was done with the Fifth Amendment
self-incrimination rulings in the Miranda and Malloy cases.
Also, the decision in Johnson as to retroactivity reemphasizes the fact that all new rulings by the Court in the criminal
procedure area will be applied prospectively. The Court, by
stating a broad rule in Miranda going beyond the facts of the
particular case, may also be indicating that it will seek to establish broad rules in other areas of criminal procedure.

